University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2007

Soviet Language Policy in Uzbekistan: How the Role of Russian
has Changed through Soviet Times and Independence
Mary Catherine Boehmer

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Boehmer, Mary Catherine, "Soviet Language Policy in Uzbekistan: How the Role of Russian has Changed
through Soviet Times and Independence" (2007). Honors Theses. 1953.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/1953

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

SOVIET LANGUAGE POLICY IN UZBEKISTAN:HOW THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN
HAS CHANGED THROUGH SOVIET TIMES AND FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE

by
Mary Catherine Boehmer

A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Mississippi in partial fulfillment of
the requirements ofthe Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College.

Oxford
May 2007

Approved by

Advisor: F^o^^r Donald Dyer

Reader: Professor Felice Coles

Reader: Professor Aileen Ajootian

©2007
Mary Catherine Boehmer
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
11

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is a product ofthe past four years of my college experience. First and
foremost, I would like to thank the faculty and staff ofthe Sally McDonnell-Barksdale
Honors College. Through the honors college, I have been provided an environment that
encourages learning and out-of-the-box thinking, and on a more practical level, a place to
get work done at any time of day or night.
I would also like to thank my former Honors 101 professor. Dr. Donald Dyer.
Three and a half years ago. Dr. Dyer introduced me to the world oflanguage, and I have
never looked back. Since then he has been my advisor, Russian instructor and mentor.
Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Felice Coles, my first professor oflinguistics
and thesis reader, who furthered my love for language.

Ill

ABSTRACT
MARY CATHERINE BOEHMER: Soviet Language Policy in Uzbekistan: How the
Role of Russian Has Changed Through Soviet Times and Following Independence
(Under the direction of Dr. Donald Dyer)

This thesis examines the progression of Soviet language policy in Uzbekistan and
its effects. It also examines how the perception of Russian has changed in post-Soviet
Uzbekistan and Uzbeks now view their own language as a direct result oflanguage
policy. I based my research on the research of others and the interview of a former
Peace Corps volunteer who lived in both Tashkent and Andijon for a total period oftwo
years. Through my investigation, I discovered how the Central Asian languages were
formed on the basis oflanguage, how Soviet leaders used both Russian and ethnic
languages to manipulate its non-Russian population, and the use oflanguage policy in
present-day Uzbekistan to distance the republic from its Soviet past. I also learned the
connotations associated with the Russian language, and the prejudice that Russophones,
even those who have attempted to learn the titular language, face as a result oftheir
inherent ties with the Russian language.
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Introduction
Over the course ofthe past century, the role ofthe Russian language in
Uzbekistan has changed considerably. From the early days ofthe Soviet Union,the
Russian language was used to assimilate citizens into a multinational state and to separate
them from their pre-Soviet past and suppress small-nation nationalism. The use of
Russian as the language was more than simply a linguafranca in a multilingual state, it
was a symbol of the power Russia held over the various nationalities and the “language
of progress.”

In Uzbekistan, Vladimir Lenin laid the foundation for future language policies by
elevating the titular language at an equal level with Russian and increasing literacy.
Joseph Stalin increased the presence and role of Russian by mandating the compulsory
study ofthe language in schools and altering Uzbek itself using the Russian writing
system, loan words and phonetics. Russification under Nikita Khrushchev, who removed
the requirement ofthe study of native languages and established numerous schools that
taught only the Russian language, largely failed, as it did under Leonid Brezhnev, whose
aim was to create a “Soviet nationality” but whose language policies simply intensified
the measures of Khrushchev’s policies. Despite the small number of Uzbek children who
attended Russian-language schools, the concept of Russification was met with

1

resentment, and political unrest resulted in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Mikhail
Gorbachev, the last leader ofthe Soviet Union, allowed Uzbekistan to elevate the titular
language to the status of state language in an attempt to diffuse anti-Soviet sentiments.

The Russian language had been a symbol ofthe manipulation ofthe largely Russian
Soviet government. Soviet language policy and Russification have altered the way in which
Uzbeks view language, both Russian and their own. Through their own language policies,
Uzbek leaders have attempted to return to their national and cultural roots suppressed under
Soviet rule.
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Chapter I; Language Policy under Lenin

Creating Identities: Nation-Building in Central Asia
In order to understand Soviet language policy, it is important to imderstand the
Soviet concept of nation-building in Uzbekistan and Central Asia. The five Central
Asian republics ofthe Soviet Union were not always the nations that they were under
Soviet rule or independently. The Bolshevik regime sought to create nations out ofthe
territories that comprised Central Asia and to promote a cultural identity that
corresponded with each state in an attempt to encourage diversity in the Soviet Union and
to create stronger relations between the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the people of
Russia.
The people of Central Asia did not consider themselves to be of a certain ethnicity
based chiefly on language. The Soviet Union, however, did. Even before the October
Revolution, the Russian concept of language was strongly linked to national identity.
Under Lenin’s power, the Soviet Union built nations with borders based on the Russian
concept oflanguage. By use ofthe census, which determined nationality largely based
on language, the Soviet government was able to differentiate among the various
“nationalities” of Central Asia and create and maintain borders, identities and cultures for
each.
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The first step in creating language policies was to determine nationalities. Prior to
the formation ofthe Soviet Union, Central Asia did not consist of predetermined nations
with borders; it consisted instead ofthree territorial states: the Emirate of Bukhara and
the Kokand and Khivan khanates. In 1918,these territories were designated as the
Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Shortly after, the Red Army entered
the territories of Bukhara and Khiva. In 1920,these two states became the Bukaharan
Soviet People’s Republic and Khorezm Soviet People’s Republic(Fierman, 1991: 44).
The people ofthese territories did not distinguish themselves as much by their
ethnicity or nationality, but rather by social criterion- whether they were rural or urban,
nomadic or sedentary, their religious views, wealth, social status, and region. Though
language was a differentiating factor, it was not the determining criterion for identity.
Furthermore, their concept oflanguage differed fi*om the Russian concept oflanguage what Russians considered to be a distinct language. Central Asians might consider only to
be a dialect(Abramson,2002: 179-180).
The basis for Soviet nation-building in Uzbekistan and Central Asia was the
Russian concept oflanguage and the Soviet census. In pre-Soviet times, the Russian
Empire considered language to be one ofthe greatest determiners of nationality. In the
Russian census of 1897, religion and language were seen as the defining criteria for
ethno-national identity, and census analysts considered language to be synonymous with
narodnosf (peoplehood) or

(nationality). Lenin and his supporters were

no different and largely defined and associated a nationality with its corresponding
language(Abramson,2002: 180-181).
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In order to create the five republics, the inhabitants ofthe Bukaharan Soviet
People’s Republic and Khorezm Soviet People’s Republic were counted and assigned
ethnic categories. In 1924,the three states of Soviet Central Asia were recreated into the
Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (which, until 1929,
was an autonomous enclave of Uzbekistan), the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, the
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic(Fierman,
1991:44).
In 1924, based on data from the census, the Soviet government mapped out
distinct, nationality-based territories and classified the people within the borders ofthese
territories as members of their corresponding nationality. Not all territories retained
equal status; they were ranked hierarchically in status into four categories. Uzbekistan,
as a union republic, held its status in the top tier of non-Russian territories(Abramson,
2002: 181).
In 1924, when borders were drawn to separate the five Central Asian republics,
many Central Asians felt that they were on the wrong side ofthe border. A group of
Central Asians labeled as Uzbeks by Russian standards protested this label, citing that
their primary occupation was agriculture rather than trade, the occupation of Uzbeks.
They further stated that their laws differed (their judges used customary law, unlike the
Uzbeks, who ruled by the Sharia, a body ofIslamic law)and their religious practices
varied. These mislabeled “Uzbeks” contrasted their culture, as they perceived it, with
Uzbek culture. Soviet surveyors perceived these “Uzbeks” to share the same culture with
other Uzbeks. In 1924, the term “Uzbek” was a political term that could only be defined
by the Soviet government(Brower,2003:89).
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In tsarist times, the people of Turkestan considered themselves to be a member of
an ethnic group based on their own definitions, which were based on their occupations.
religious practices, law and other criteria. Under the new Soviet system,this was no
longer acceptable (Brower,2003: 181).
The main issue that the Soviet government faced was drawing borders. The
Soviet government was not so much ofthe beliefthat every nation had a nationality; it
was of the belief that every nationality should have a nation (Grenoble, 2003:40). Once
Central Asia was divided into five republics, each with its own titular nationality, the
people ofthese territories would eventually believe that they truly were members ofthat
nationality. Aggression among the various ethnicities in each republic would diminish in
time, and the people would eventually accept and celebrate their status as a member of
the titular nationality (Smith, 1990: 217).
The peoples of Central Asia had been delegated their new identities. In the eyes
ofthe Russian government,they would no longer be Russified Turks, but Uzbeks,
Turkmen, Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz ofthe Soviet Union(Brower,2003:181).
Uzbekistan never gained the prominence ofa sovereign state, but its designation
as a socialist republic validated its identity as a nationality. As a result, the citizens of
Uzbekistan were able to imagine themselves as members of a true nationality whose
citizens could be counted and their existence as a nation supported by data(Abramson,
2002: 181).
In the first twenty years ofthe Soviet regime, censuses used the category of
nationality to convince its citizens that the hierarchical state and ethnic and linguistic
structure ofthe Soviet Union was in fact evidence of its true composition. The use of the
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census was cyclical: the census was based on the idea of hierarchy among different ethnic
groups according to their levels of development, and the information presented in the
census reaffirmed these beliefs. Those citizens deemed to have a national identity
realized their higher status as a nationality or ethnic group(Abramson, 2002:181).
Ultimately, the Soviet Union created the nation of Uzbekistan, like all the Central
Asian Republics, based on the model ofthe Russian state(Abramson,2002: 181).

Language Policy under Lenin: Its Purpose and Goals
It is difficult to say what the Soviet Union hoped to gain through its language
policies. Policy was meticulously planned, carefully executed and dealt with hundreds of
vastly different languages. The execution ofits early policies is clear, but its motives in
creating each aspect oflanguage policy are complex and even today are not entirely
understood. Policies seemed inconsistent with other goals at the time oftheir creation,
and later policies often seemed to contradict earlier goals. It is even more difficiilt to
discern what the Soviet government hoped to achieve because it was rarely open about its
true purposes. Evaluating Soviet language policy is problematic, since it is difficult to
gain an understanding ofthe success ofa policy without knowing what it was originally
meant to accomplish (Grenoble,2003: 26).
From the very beginning, Soviet leaders understood just how important language
policy would be. The Soviet Union was comprised of over 100 languages, and it would
be impossible to preserve the Soviet state without both acknowledging the necessity of
and meticulously planning language policies(Grenoble, 2003:2).
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Following the 1917 revolution, Vladimir Lenin came into power as the Soviet
Union’s first leader. Lenin’s goals in executing language policy in the Soviet Union were
both practical and ideological in nature. In practical terms, he sought to eradicate or
significantly reduce illiteracy. Ideologically, Lenin’s greatest hope was to create a new
society based on linguistic equality. He further hoped,through the implementation of
language policies to promote unification and socialist principles, to suppress the constant
threat of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism in Central Asia, and by increasing literacy rates
to modernize the newly-formed state until it became a world power.
Ofthese goals, literacy was perhaps the easiest to obtain. Though thorough
planning was required to realize a literate nation, the task was not conceptually abstract
and would provide quantitative rather than qualitative results. Also, it was unlikely that
the path to literacy would produce wildly unexpected consequences. Finally, the main
object ofthis part ofthe language policy — literacy -could be realized relatively quickly.
While other aspects oflanguage policy sought to unite the diverse nationalities ofthe new
Bolshevik state for centuries to come, and might take almost as long to fully accomplish,
literacy rates could climb in a matter of decades.
The biggest objective in furthering literacy was modernization. Low literacy rates
reflected upon a poor system of education. Education and literacy were closely linked,
and without a better system of education, the Soviet Union would never catch up to the
advancements ofthe West and would not become a world power. The plight of literacy
in an effort to progress to the standards ofthe West was also an attempt to prove the
effectiveness ofthe socialist system in advancing primitive peoples to the standards of
the modem world (Abramson,2002: 181).
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Though advancing literacy would raise education levels and aid the Soviet Union
in its ambition of progress, other reasons existed for advancing literacy. Language was
the way in which people communicate and unless peoples ofthe Soviet Union were
literate, it would be nearly impossible to communicate socialist beliefs to the population.
Without higher literacy rates, the Soviet Union would not only fail in modernizing itself
to the standards ofthe West, it would fail as a state if unable to communicate with all its
citizens.
Early policies, therefore, attempted to improve education and literacy levels
immediately. This was impossible to achieve unless languages were standardized
(Grenoble, 2003: 2). The act of officially altering a language, whether it is a process of
standardization ofthe grammar, its written form, or its pronunciation, or an attempt to
modernize its vocabulary, is usually politically motivated and an attempt to correct
something - whether it is language itself, the symbol which a language represents, or a
problem connected v^th the language(Landau,2001: 148).
Standardization ofthe language, the Soviet government believed, required a new
alphabet. The Arabic alphabet, with which Uzbek and many other languages of Central
Asia were written, lacked the letters that Turkic languages needed. Though each Turkic
language slightly modified the Arabic script to account for these phonemes, it was
perceived by the Soviet Union to be inadequate. Additionally, though a written system of
Uzbek already existed, there was no standardized spelling. Lenin proposed the
implementation ofthe Latin alphabet and standardized spelling.
The Latin alphabet, like the Arabic alphabet, lacked symbols for several
phonemes in Uzbek and Turkic languages and required slight modifications to conform to
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the different phonemes ofthe languages. In reality, the Arabic alphabet was not
significantly less suited to the phonology ofthe Turkic languages than the Latin alphabet.
The true hindrance to literacy was the lack of standardized spelling and dialectical
variations. Dialects differed in pronunciation, and without a form of standardized
spelling, a given word could be spelled any number of ways. Words were written based
on sound; since pronunciation differed among dialects, the same word would be spelled
differently for each accent.
The aim in removing the Arabic alphabet, a script revered by Muslims the world
over because it was the script ofthe original Qu’ran, was to distance the Central Asian
peoples from the religion of Islam. This served two purposes. First, it helped remove a
major symbol of religion, which was strictly forbidden in the new socialist state. Second,
and more importantly, it helped to suppress the threat of pan-Islamism and to a lesser
extent, pan-Turkism (Brower,2003:181).
Turkestan, as the Russian territories of Central Asia were known before the
Revolution, had the unfortunate label of being predominantly and fanatically Muslim.
The identity of Central Asia was already known by the Russian government, both past
and present. The perception ofthese people would remain the same under the Soviet
government as under the tsarist regime(Brower, 2003:179).
The Arabic alphabet had served as a linguafranca for Turkic speakers of Central
Asia. Since the languages of pre-Soviet Central Asia were written with the Arabic script,
those who were literate were often able to read other Turkic dialects and languages.
Because of this, Turks could communicate not only with other Turks of Central Asia, but
also with the Turks ofthe Russian Empire,such as Kazan Tatars. The Arabic script was
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the one thing tsarist Turks shared, both as a means of communication and a symbol of
their Islamic heritage (Bacon, 1966: 189-190).
The Soviet government hoped to distance the various nationalities of Central Asia
from each other and from Islam. By introducing the Latin alphabet, literate Central
Asians would be unable to read the Qu’ran,thus creating a barrier between them and
Islam. Additionally, Central Asians would be unable to communicate with their
neighbors-the use ofthe Arabic alphabet as a ling^afranca would disappear. Lenin
knew that subduing Islam in Central Asia would be difficult, and the introduction of the
Latin alphabet was an excellent way to suppress neutrally the Muslim culture in Central
Asia.
Though literacy was one of Lenin’s greatest goals(and indeed, it was a crucial
step in bringing the state up to the advanced standards of Western Europe and the world),
at the core of Lenin’s beliefs was the idea of egalitarianism among all nationalities. As
early as 1914, Lenin constructed plans to achieve such equality by guaranteeing rights for
national minorities and freedom and equal status of all languages. Lenin emphasized the
need for language choice in schools and all state institutions, and felt that any members of
a nationality who felt that their rights were in any way violated should be compensated.
While he understood that nationalism and Marxism could not co-exist, he believed in and
promoted the idea that all Soviet citizens should be allowed to determine their identities
as members of a nationality, especially through language(Grenoble, 2003: 35).
Lenin believed in the equality of all nations, but the objective of his language
policy was focused more on unifying the Soviet state. He believed that unity would not
be possible by means ofencouraging diversity, but through assimilation of all cultures.
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Supporting minority languages and cultures upheld the beliefs ofthe Bolshevik party,
and in the instability following the Revolution, support for Bolshevik ideals was top
priority (Zisserman-Brodsky,2003:20).
Lenin attempted to use language policy to appeal to both Russians and ethnic
minorities. By granting equal linguistic rights to all nationalities, he hoped to promote
feelings of interethnic unity rather than separatism throughout the new state (Fierman,
1991: 46). He also represented support ofethnic languages as synonymous with “class
solidarity.” He concentrated not on celebrating diversity but creating an egalitarian
society that did not discriminate against ethnic background (Zisserman-Brodsky,
2003:20).
Ultimately, Lenin saw language not only as a marker ofidentity, but as a means to
an end. Through language policies, he would use language to achieve the goals ofthe
Bolshevik party and to strengthen the newly formed Soviet Union(Abramson,2002:
179). His literacy campaign and platform ofequal linguistic rights were not constructed
in the hopes of achieving full linguistic equality. By introducing language
standardization and the Latin alphabet, Lenin would distance Central Asians from their
past, each other and their common religion and culture ofIslam, and celebrate them as
individual nationalities. Though it appeared that the Soviet Union was intent on
commemorating the diversity ofits many nationalities, it was the Soviet government that
defined these nationalities. Lenin’s nationalities policy and language policy were the first
step in creating Soviet citizens out of Russified Turks.
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The Process of Language Policy under Lenin
Prior to Soviet intervention, the predominant language groups of Central Asia
were the Turkic and Persian languages. A variation ofone ofthese languages was
spoken by nearly all the people of Soviet Central Asia, and most people were able to
communicate in both(Abramson,2002: 179).
Ofthe Turkic languages, the speakers of Uzbek were the most prominent in
number and the most geographically centered. The five million speakers of Uzbek were
predominantly located in Soviet Uzbekistan, Chinese Turkestan and Afghanistan. Two
major dialects of Uzbek were noted -the dialect of Tashkent, and the dialect of
Samarkand, Bukhara and Kokand. Uzbek, like many ofthe Turkic languages of Central
Asia, was written using a modified Arabic script.(Matthews, 1951: 83).
Following the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet leaders began their linguistic
reforms. The first ten years ofthe new regime focused on korenizatsiia, or the idea of
linguistic equality as an important aspect ofthe broader social policy. Korenizatsiia refers
to the Soviet ethnic policy ofindigenization. Lenin’s focus was to spread the communist
movement to other nations. Thus,this policy aimed at encouraging non-Russian citizens
to learn both Russian and their native languages and elevating the status ofthe titular
languages to that ofRussian. Under korenizatsiia, Uzbek was officially declared to be of
equal status with Russian in 1918. Steps were made to force Europeans in Uzbekistan to
comply with the language policy, including deadlines for uzbekization (Fierman, 1985:
206).
At the Second Congress ofthe Bolshevik Party, equal rights were granted to all
citizens, regardless oftheir sex, religion, race, and nationality; citizens were also
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promised that all nationalities would have the opportunity to receive an education in their
own language and equal status of minority languages at the local and state levels
(Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003:20).
Korenizatsiia and the standardization oflanguage were linked. It would be
impossible to promote a language and raise it to equal status with Russian without
determining standard rules of grammar and spelling, and without choosing which dialect
of the language would be used.
Thus, to promote literacy and standardize minority languages for its many
nationalities, the Bolshevik government was met with the task ofdistinguishing between
and defining the languages ofits various nationalities. Government officials were faced
with choosing a single dialect of Uzbek in the new state of Uzbekistan. The Uzbek ofthe
Tashkent region was selected and fi*om that point on,if Uzbek was used in any official
sphere, it was the Uzbek of Tashkent(Landau,2001:155).
Once the Uzbek of Tashkent had been selected as the standard, altering the
writing system was the next step. In 1923, Soviet leaders implemented an enhanced
Arabic script for Uzbek, along with similarly adapted alphabets for Kazakh and Kirgiz,
but it soon became clear that the continued use ofthis script both distanced Soviet
Central Asia fi*om Russia and provided a common bond among Central Asians. By 1925,
the use ofthe Arabic alphabet in new printed materials was prohibited(Bacon, 1966:
190).
A year before the prohibition ofthe Arabic alphabet, the Azerbaijan Soviet
Socialist Republic had begun to use a Latin alphabet. After observing this success,
Soviet leaders decreed the use ofthe Latin alphabet for all Turkic languages in the Soviet
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Union in 1926. In 1927, a modified Latin alphabet with additional symbols to represent
Turkic phonemes was adopted. The New Turkic Alphabet, as it was called, was
established as the new writing system in 1928 and was met with little resistance by
Central Asians(Bacon, 1966: 190).
By 1930, Latinization had occurred in Central Asia. The Latin alphabet was used
in textbooks for schools and in all official forms of print(Bacon, 1966: 191).
In its drive to standardize language, the Soviet government controlled the content
of education. Though Lenin promised that all nationalities would have the option to
receive education in their own languages, they were not allowed to choose the content of
this education (Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003: 20).
Uzbek was taught and promoted as the language of Uzbek republic and presented
as source of ethnic pride for its people. At the same time, it acquired a number ofloan
words from the Russian language, not only to modernize the vocabulary of Uzbek and the
other Turkic languages but also to help bridge the culture gap between Central Asia and
Russia and to help Central Asians adapt to the growing presence of Russian language and
culture in the region(Landau,2001: 155).
Local languages and dialects remained in use within their communities, but
Russian was taught and used as the language ofcommunication within the education
system. Soviet leaders could not suppress the use of local languages outside the sphere of
education, but they could control and prevent nationalist tendencies within educational
institutions and encourage the use of Russian(Williams, 1999: 33).
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Results of Language Policy under Lenin
From the very beginning, Soviet leaders understood just hov^ important language
policy would be. The Soviet Union was comprised ofover 100 languages, and it would
be impossible to preserve the Soviet state ^vithout both acknowledging and planning
language policies (Grenoble, 2003: 2).
The goals ofthe Soviet government in its early language policy were to increase
literacy, to modernize Central Asia and to suppress pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, while
promoting equality and unity with Russia and the Soviet Union. Ofthese goals, literacy
had high priority and could be most easily measured.
At the time ofthe Bolshevik revolution, only 28.4 percent ofthe population ofthe
Soviet Union was literate. In some areas, the population was completely illiterate. In
order to transform the Soviet Union into a modem,industrialized nation, it was necessary
to increase literacy rates among its population (Grenoble,2003: 35).
In 1897, only 2.2 percent of men and 0.4 percent of women classified as members
ofthe Turko-Tatar ethnolinguistic group(which included the republics of Central Asia)
were literate in the Russian language. In non-Russian languages, 7.3 percent of men and
4.6 percent of women were literate. Only 0.1 percent of men and 0.001 percent of
women had been educated beyond the primary level(Kaiser, 1994: 70).
In its goal ofincreasing literacy, it is difficult to determine just how effective
Latinization proved to be. Data shows a dramatic increase in literacy rates in a relatively
short period oftime, but no set standards were in place to measure degrees of literacy.
Many Uzbeks felt that they were literate if they were able to write their name and read a
few words.
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Despite the lack of uniform criteria, it is clear that the process oflanguage
standardization proved in the end to be quite successful. Orthography reform was a
major component ofthis success, since its standardization ofthe language made it much
easier to read (Fierman, 1991: 27). In its first twenty years, the Soviet Union transformed
itselffrom a largely illiterate to a highly literate state (Grenoble, 2003: 2).
In a 1926 census, 3.8 percent ofthe total Uzbek population was literate. Six years
later, 52.5 percent was considered to be literate (Smith, 1990: 217).
By 1926, urban males in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic had a literacy rate of
45.5 percent; females had 25.3 percent. In rural areas Uzbek males had achieved a
literacy rate of 70.0 percent while females had achieved a rate of57.6 percent. By 1939,
the 73.9 percent of urban females and 85 percent of males were literate; 70 percent of
rural males and 57.6 percent of rural females were literate. It was expected that rural
areas would have lower literacy rates, since educational institutions and materials were
less available than in urban areas(Grenoble, 2003:156).
In 1926 in the UzSSR, people aged 9-49 held a literacy rate of 11.7 percent; 50
and older held a literacy rate of 5.4 percent. By 1939, Uzbek citizens aged 9-49 had
increased their literacy rate to 78.8 percent, and those aged 50 and older had increased
their literacy to 15.1 percent. Evidence that the literacy campaign achieved some
measure of success is provided by the official data on literacy rates by generation. The
youngest group had the highest level ofliteracy and indicated generational increases in
the future (Grenoble, 2003: 156).
The implementation ofthe Latin alphabet did also distance Uzbeks and other
Central Asians firom their past. By 1930, hundreds ofthousands of Central Asians knew
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only the Latin alphabet as a written form. The Arabic script had been forbidden in new
printed materials, and as a result, many Central Asians were unable to read the classic
literature oftheir past or read the Qu’ran and other religious works. Central Asians were
learning to read and write with the Latin alphabet as the first and only alphabet that they
would know (Bacon, 1966:191).
Generations of Uzbeks and other Soviet Central Asians would view their culture
anew. Latinization meant that Uzbeks were isolated not only from their pre-Soviet
written works, but also from first-hand writings ofthe early years under Soviet rule.
Literacy allowed them to read only a fraction oftheir written cultural works(Smith,
1990:217).
In time, Russian began to replace Arabic as a linguafranca. The Turkic
languages, separated and using differently modified forms ofthe Latin alphabet, could no
longer communicate in any Muslim or Arabic language or script. Latinization had
succeeded in isolating Soviet Muslims from other Muslims and succeeded in isolating the
Turkic languages. The only language Central Asians now shared was Russian(Blank,
1994: 135).
Soviet leaders had redefined what it meant to be “Uzbek,” and the Uzbeks, no
longer able to define themselves by their pre-Revolution standards, began to accept their
Soviet identities and defined themselves according to Soviet criteria. For four years after
the formation ofthe Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, Uzbek elite debated who among
them could truly be called Uzbek. Their distinctions, following the Soviet example, were
based largely on dialects. Because the local and Russian government differentiated
between languages and dialects in separate ways, many “Uzbeks” by local definition
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were not included in the new state. In Kirgizia, the Uzbek intelligentsia located a group
of true “Uzbeks” that the Soviet government considered to be Kyrgyz. The Uzbeks of
this area appealed to Moscow to be included in Uzbekistan. These Kyrgyz Uzbeks had
begun to believe in the concept of nationality, a concept which was unknown to the area
prior to Soviet intervention (Ketzer and Arel, 2002: 32).
It is not important whether these misplaced Uzbeks were truly Uzbek or truly
believed themselves to be Uzbek. Ultimately, the petitioners used language to fight for
their status as members of a certain nationality, and in believing themselves to be Uzbek,
they made the Soviet state-assigned categories and corresponding languages real. In
earlier times, Uzbeks, like most Central Asians, did not use language to distinguish
between themselves, and many Central Asians did not expect that the Soviet government
would identify them based on language. As a result, language policy would have a
greater effect on the new republics of Central Asia and would play a major role in
shaping the new states (Ketzer and Arel, 2002: 32).
Even in the early days oftheir formation. Central Asians within their respective
republics quickly embraced Soviet ethno-national labels. They believed themselves to be
what Soviet leaders had told them they were and began gaining a strong sense of national
pride for the republic in which they lived (Brower,2003: 181).
Soviet language policies were intended to manipulate the sentiment of nonRussians in the Soviet Union. In the years following the Bolshevik Revolution, the
Soviet central power created a nationalities policy to promote Communist ideology and
leadership in the sentiment of equality among all the nations within the Union,though it
was the Soviet Union that defined these nationalities. By promoting the use and
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development of non-Russian languages, it was believed that antagonistic feelings toward
Soviet power would be resolved and create feelings of well-being and stability
throughout all nations ofthe Soviet Union(Landau,2001:51-52).
In the mid-1920s, minority languages began to flourish in educational institutions.
The number of educational institutions teaching minority languages quickly exceeded the
number of schools teaching Russian (Blank, 1994:133). As they gained knowledge.
ethnic minorities in Central Asia began to use their gift oflanguage against those who
had given it to them -the Soviet Union(Landau,2001: 52).
Korenizatsiia failed to suppress centralization and nationalism in Central Asia.
The greatest achievement of Lenin’s language policy was that it did succeed in
suppressing pan-Islamism through Latinization (Blank, 1994:133). The process of
korenizatsiia sought to subdue anti-Russian sentiment in the non-Russian territories.
Instead of cultivating feelings of goodwill towards the Russian government, it instead
encouraged extreme nationalism in the territories and a sense of unity among the Central
Asian republics.
In its early days and indeed through its entire duration, language policy in the
USSR was intended to preserve the delicate balance between promoting the convenient
and modem Russian language while maintaining the necessity of native languages and
respecting the emotional bond they represented. Early language policy sought to take
advantage ofthe emotional bond oflanguage that non-Russians held (Lewis, 1972: 60).
Lenin hoped that Latinization would increase literacy, and it did. Though
effective, it made it difficult for non-Russians to leam the Cyrillic alphabet and the
Russian language, and slowed the addition of Russian loanwords into the Turkic

20

languages(Bacon, 1966: 194). Since it was necessary to promote Russian as a lingua
franca, the Latin alphabet was ultimately found to be ineffective as a writing system.
Lenin’s language policy increased literacy and eradicated the threat of panIslamism, but also increased hypemationalism and pan-Turkism in the new republics.
The promotion of individual cultures and languages was no longer feasible. In the 1930s,
Lenin’s policies would be replaced with policies that promoted Russian rather than ethnic
languages, and Russification would replace multiculturalism. Ideological conformity
would be the new requirement(Williams, 1999: 30).
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Chapter II: Language Policy under Stalin

Language Policy under Stalin: Its Purpose and Goals

When Vladimir Lenin came to power as the first leader ofthe Soviet Union, he
feared the threat of Russian chauvinism, especially in the forced promotion of Russian
over ethnic languages. Lenin had fought for linguistic and cultural freedom ofthe
republics in preparation for a “world revolution.” His language policies were greatly
influenced by the sentiment ofthe people ofthe Soviet Union at that time. In the first
years following the Bolshevik regime, the people looked forward to freedom from the
former authoritarian regime(Landau,2001: 53).

The intentions and policies of Joseph Stalin, who succeeded Lenin upon his death
in 1924, seem to contrast greatly. While Lenin sought a Soviet Union in which all
languages and cultures were valued and received equal treatment, Stalin sought to form a
single state with an indisputable language policy. Stalin, like Lenin,formulated policies
based on the attitudes ofthe people. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union had moved from the
“emancipation phase” to the “coordination phase.” Once in the “coordination phase,” the
administration ofthe Soviet Union employed newer, stricter measures for its outlying
lands to achieve their own ideological and economic goals. To achieve these goals, one
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common language was essential, and the choice of Russian was predetermined (Landau,
2001: 53).

Though on the surface Lenin and Stalin seem to differ very much in their beliefs
on the on the topic of linguistic Russification, their ideals were not so dissimilar. Lenin
fought against the forced use of Russian within Central Asia and other non-Russian areas,
but he also made no effort to protect minority cultures against compulsory Russification.
Both Lenin and Stalin believed language to be the key identifying aspect of culture and
aimed to manipulate minority groups through this belief By promoting linguistic
equality in the various nationalities, Lenin was able to promote feelings of goodwill
among the non-Russian cultures, which would ease the eventual assimilation of all
peoples ofthe Soviet Union (Blank, 1994, 126-7).
Stalin feared that nationalism rather than Russian chauvinism now posed the
greatest danger to the USSR. Stalin unofficially ended korenizatsiia, a policy that had
been in decline for some time (Fierman, 1985: 207). The “socialist offensive'

had

diminished. Stalin claimed the Soviet state had achieved modernization and
industrialization while remaining unwaveringly socialist. The initial goals ofthe USSR
had been realized: all minority groups had been represented to the fullest and granted
equal rights. There was no longer any need for such groups as the Women’s Department,
the Jevvdsh Section or the Committee for the Assistance to the Peoples ofthe Northern
Borderlands, and so they were all disbanded (Slezkine, 2000: 331-2).
In the early 1930s, the one ethnic group somewhat ignored by the post-Revolution
leaders became acknowledged - Russian. While the non-Russian nationalities ofthe
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USSR were being defined and promoted,the “Russian” ethnicity was the “other”
ethnicity - if one was not a member of an ethnic minority, you were Russian. As the
focus on minority nationalities and languages began to fade, Russians were presented
with a national identity oftheir own, with a national past, literary language and
iconography. By 1934,“derussification” had not only diminished as a priority, it was
regarded as criminal. Russians, Soviet leaders came to realize, did not have a clearly
defined national territory, ethnic or historic past. However, Russians were identified
most closely identified with the Soviet state. Because ofthis, the Cyrillic alphabet came
to replace the Latin alphabet between 1937 and 1939, and in 1938, Russian became
mandatory as a second language in non-Russian schools. The past ofthe Soviet Union
was becoming more closely tied to Russia. The ideals of“internationalism” among the
various nationalities ofthe Soviet Union, which later became “firiendship ofthe peoples,’
were concepts that could only be expressed in the Russian language. As Soviet leaders
sought to emphasize the Russian aspect ofthe Soviet Union, they did not perceive
themselves to be excessive - no one fought to promote a “Soviet nation” or fought for
Russian as the first language ofthe Soviet Union (Slezkine, 2000: 332).

Stalin saw it necessary to campaign for “Soviet” patriotism; that is, patriotism
among all nationalities, not for their individual republics, but for the Soviet state to which
they all belonged. Since the term “Soviet’ was largely synonymous with “Russian,”
Soviet patriotism would be best supported through linguistic Russificiation (Lewis, 1972:
72)

Stalin understood fully the strong feelings people held for their national languages
and realized that such attachment should not he ignored or suppressed, but manipulated.
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For example, during the 1926 conflict in Ukraine he showed support for and promoted
the recognition of Ukrainian culture and disapproved of all who did not share his
appreciation. To show his further support, at the 22°^* Party Congress he demanded the
“free development ofthe language ofthe peoples ofthe USSR and the complete freedom
ofthe citizens to speak and to rear and educate their children in any language.” He
believed language to be the “opiate ofthe nationals.” He saw no harm in permitting the
use of national languages so long as Soviet ideals and institutions were not affected by it
(Lewis, 1972: 60-1). Korenizatsiia had already provided a solid base for Russification.
The time was now right: natives were already educated and literacy rates were increasing
exponentially, an indication that they were prepared for the study ofthe Russian language
and to adapt to Russian ways. Additionally, the privileged status that their language had
held (theoretically, at least) lessened the chance of any strong reactions in response to a
greater emphasis on the role of Russian in their areas(Fierman, 1985:214).

An additional factor in Stalin’s policy oflinguistic Russification was the necessity
of knowledge of the Russian language to understand socialist ideology. In 1933 it was
suggested that not only was it necessary for Russians to learn the native language(s) of
the republics, it was also necessary for non-Russians to study the Russian language to
understand better Marxist-Leninist theory and the sciences(Grenoble, 2003: 147).
The promotion of Russian to a “second mother tongue” was the also the most
economical option for the USSR. Though language was seen as a key identifying factor
of ethnicity, it is also, ultimately, the way in which people communicate. A lingua
franca of Russian meant that publications and communication in minority languages
would no longer be necessary, saving a great deal oftime and money. In written form.

25

Russian could be used to communicate with anyone in the vast Soviet Union. Its
vocabulary and grammar were far more developed than the other languages, and 'with
Russian-based loan words, it would also allow various nationalities to understand and use
national-technical terminology and the sociopolitical vocabulary of professional
language. Russian could positively affect national languages as well: by adding its
extensive vocabulary and some grammatical rules, it could easily improve the
underdeveloped national languages(Fierman, 2003:144). Communist leaders felt that
Russification would enrich the local languages by pro'viding terms and concepts derived
from Russian (Bacon, 1966:198).

Following this belief, the USSR considered Central Asian culture to be primitive
and feudal, and Communist leaders discouraged the sharing ofcommon bonds between
different Turkic nationalities and other Muslims. It was essential to separate further the
nationalities by obliterating their greatest common bond -their past- while at the same
time forging deeper connections with Russia. The policy of“internationalism” was put
into place to accomplish this(Fierman, 1991:126). The general sentiment among Soviet
leaders of the time was that diversity no longer needed to be celebrated, but unity. By
enforcing the use ofthe Cyrillic alphabet for all languages, Russians and non-Russians
would share a writing system. The idea of Russian as an enforced part ofthe curriculum
meant that all peoples ofthe USSR would be united not only under one alphabet, but also
imder one language (Fierman, 2003: 146).

In 1930 in Uzbekistan, Russian was necessary for those who aimed for a post
secondary education, but most Uzbeks found Russian to be unnecessary. Uzbek
intelligentsia felt that it would be more beneficial for Russians to learn Uzbek than for
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Uzbeks to leam Russian (Fierman, 1985:213-4). In 1934,the Soviet government had
begun to distance itself from the concept of korenizatsiia. Though Uzbek and other
national languages remained in use in education, Soviet leaders no longer promoted the
national languages or cultures. Compulsory promotion ofethnic minorities based on
their background instead of other qualifications ended, and the rights of minority
languages no longer took precedence with the government. The linguistic rights and
ideals that Lenin had promoted were forgotten. In the years leading up to Cyrillicization
and mandatory Russian curriculum, native languages were already losing governmental
priority, while Russian gained it. In 1938,the language policy of Russification was
adopted by Soviet leaders, and Russian would grow even more in status while native
languages lost official precedence (Grenoble, 2003:147).

The Process of Language Policy under Stalin

Stalin assumed leadership ofthe USSR following Lenin’s death in 1924. For the
first several years of his leadership, language policy remained unchanged. However,in
the 1930s, language policy began to shift. At the 17* Party Congress, Stalin essentially
ended korenizatsiia. Stalin declared the mandatory study of Russian on March 13,1938,
in the midst of a push for the push for Cyrillicization of all non-Russian languages. The
end of korenizatsiia, compulsory study of Russian and use ofthe Cyrillic alphabet
indicate intentional Russification. Unlike the prospect of Latinization, Cyrillicization
was not discussed among panels or in forums as to how it related to required Russian
education or if a relationship between the two existed at all(Grenoble, 2003: 54).
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He never officially ended korenizatsna, but in Stalin’s 1934 address to the 17

Party Congress, he stated that Russian chauvinism was no longer the greatest threat to the
Soviet Union. Lenin had promoted national languages and cultures to avoid such a threat
and even accepted the risk of“small-nation nationalism” in avoiding Russian chauvinism.
Stalin felt that the danger of Russian chauvinism had now passed, and the danger now lay
in the growing nationalist sentiments of Central Asia(Grenoble,2003:45).

The process of linguistic Russification of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek language can
be seen in the large number of Russian loan words,the use ofthe Cyrillic alphabet, the
heightened status of Russian in Uzbekistan and the addition of Russian phonemes to
Uzbek.

Russification of Uzbek

The Russification of Uzbek was reminiscent ofthe heavy borrowing from Arabic
and Persian prior to the revolution. However,the use of Russian loan words in Uzbek
was intended to unite and strengthen the bonds between the people of Uzbekistan with
the Soviet Union rather than the Arabic-Persian region(Fierman, 1991:53).

The campaign for the Cyrillic script began in 1935-6 in the Russian SFSR. It was
not long before all languages within the RSFSR used Cyrillic, and the policy was
introduced to the non-Russian languages in 1939. The Azerbaijan SSR was the first
union republic to convert to Cyrillic. In 1940, all languages ofthe Soviet Union were to
officially use the Cyrillic script(Grenoble,2003: 51).

28

Soviet leaders wanted to implement a pure Cyrillic alphabet for Uzbek, with no
symbols added or removed to better match with the language. The Cyrillic alphabet was
ill-suited for phonetics of Uzbek and other Turkic languages. Though many argued that
the phonetic influence ofthe Arabic and Persian languages continued to “hold back [the
language] in its old forms,” the Cyrillic alphabet of Russian was modified to fit Uzbek
since the only remaining option was to allow Uzbek to use an alphabet symbolically
connected with the past. Uzbekistan made the decision to switch their alphabet fi*om
Latin to Cyrillic in 1940(Fierman, 1985:216).

The Cyrillic alphabet chosen included graphemes to represent the sounds in
Uzbek the original alphabet could not produce. These graphemes used were
modifications of Russian letters. No effort was made to coordinate the Uzbek alphabet
with the alphabets for other Turkic languages. When the Latin alphabet was adopted for
Uzbek in 1926,the All-Union Committee ofthe New Turkic Alphabet spent a great
amount of effort in creating an alphabet as unified as possible throughout the Turkic
languages. As a result, the Turkic speakers ofthe Soviet Union felt a bond of unity. The
Cyrillic alphabet was modified slightly for each Turkic language ofthe Soviet Union. As
opposed to the Unified Turkic Alphabet, which provided one symbol per phoneme,
regardless ofthe language, the new Cyrillic alphabet differentiated the same phoneme
among different languages(Bacon, 1966:195). The new alphabet introduced to the
Turkic languages made it possible to present symbols to indicate different phonemes not
accounted for in the Cyrillic Script and created a stronger symbolic bond with the Soviet
Union and divided the Turkic languages(Fierman, 1985:216-7).
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The Cyrillic alphabet was not the only thing that would change in Uzbek. Over
the course of its implementation, a number of Russian terms and concepts were created to
describe new political, economic and social conditions. The source ofthe majority of
these was Russian, and many others were international words Russian had acquired.
Several methods were used to deal with the numerous loan words. The Russian term
might be translated into the semantic equivalent of Turkic-for example, the Russian
term “five-year plan” translated to beshiyllyq {besh, “five;” iyh “year;” lyq, a Turkish
suffix representing). In the 1920s, Uzbeks and other Turkic speakers favored Persian
words for Russian concepts. The term inquilob (revolution) was used rather than
revolutsiia; and Karakalpak speakers adopted shaitan arba, or “devil cart” for velociped,
the Russian word for “bicycle.”(Bacon, 1966: 195).

Though Turkic speakers preferred to use Turkic, Persian and Arabic terms for
their loan vocabulary, the continuous use of Russian terms surrounded them in
publications, educational institutions and in speeches. Cyrillicization smoothed the
process of adding Russian vocabulary to Uzbek and other Turkic languages. Words that
already existed in the Turkic languages, such as the Uzbek dorulfunm (“university”)
were eventually replaced with the Russian universitet. The addition ofloan words to
describe newly invented concepts is a phenomenon that has occurred for centuries in all
languages-for example. Central Asian nomads used the Arabic and Persian terms for
»» a

book,

paper” and “pen” because they were introduced to these objects by the Arabs

and Persians. Similarly, new concepts were introduced from the Russians, and the
Russian term for these concepts made its way into Turkic vocabulary(Bacon, 1966: 195196).
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During the internationalization of its lexicon, Uzbek supposedly continued to use
its own terms if already in place. In practice, international terms came to gradually
replace their former Uzbek counterparts. Officially, Uzbek was permitted to continue to
use its own terms if a foreign term existed, and only once Uzbek had begun to use that
form rather than its equivalent would the non-Uzbek term be adopted(Fierman, 1991:
161).

The focus ofthe Soviet government was no longer on equality among all
nationalities. Uzbeks were no longer promoted to leadership positions unless they
possessed some level of appreciation and understanding for Russian culture. This was
even truer for positions in which Uzbeks would be in close contact with non-Central
Asians. Because ofthis, rules of phonology and orthography were aligned Avith the
dialect of the Uzbeks who maintained a close relationship with Soviet leaders. Moscow
reasoned that these Uzbeks, who held such an appreciation for Russian culture, would be
more developed and therefore more likely to know the “correct” pronunciation of Uzbek
words. The “correct” pronunciation applied the rules of Russian phonology to Russian
loan words in Uzbek(Fierman, 1991: 126).

As early as 1930, a panel at the Uzbek State Scientific Research Institute agreed
that complications arose from Uzbek phonetics, which did not permit consonant clusters
at the beginning of words. The name “Stalin,” for example, had in the past been written
as “Istolin,

((

Istalin,” and “Sitolin,” among other spellings. It was decided that European

words that began with double consonants would not follow spellings mandated by Uzbek
phonetics. A year later, the Uzbek State Terminological Committee concluded that the
vowel harmony should be eradicated for all European loan words(Fierman, 1991: 126).
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The USSR hoped to develop and modernize the vocabulary of Uzbek and other
Turkic languages with Russian loan words. It is difficult to adopt loan words into foreign
vocabulary unless they meet the phonological and grammatical requirements ofthe
adopting language. In the 1920s, Turkic speakers simply altered Russian terms to fit into
their language, most notably by altering the phonetic structure to achieve vowel harmony.
Soon the influx of Russian loan vocabulary was too great to revise phonetically each
word, and Turkic speakers generally ended their attempts to do so and accepted Russian
words in their given phonetic form (Fierman, 1991: 53). Among the other important
ways in which the orthography and alphabet as adopted in 1940 embodied the attempt to
come closer to Russian were the adoption ofthe Russian letters “ye ”“yo»” “yu,” and
“ya,” and the insistence that Uzbek words with sounds more suitably written with two
separate letters rather than one nevertheless use Russian letters. (Fierman, 1985: 217).

In the dialects ofthe “oasis” cities ofthe former Turkestan, this phenomenon was
much more common,since rules concerning vowel harmony had mostly been forgotten
due to Persian influence. Under the influence ofRussian, other urban centers also began
to lose vowel harmony. In rural centers, vowel harmony remained, most likely due to
less contact with new Russian concepts and the corresponding loan words. Rural
inhabitants for the most part continued to modify phonetically Russian loan vocabulary to
achieve vowel harmony (Fierman, 1991:53).

Uzbek language also underwent major orthographic changes during this time. It
was suggested that European words that had been adopted by the Russian language
should be written as Russian phonetics and orthography dictated, rather than as a direct
European loan word. In 1934, it was officially decreed that Uzbek orthography would
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abandon the double consonant rule at the beginning of words. As a result, the Russian
99

terms “Stalin,

traktor” and “stol” became Stalin, traktor and stol in Uzbek (Fierman,

1991: 129).

In addition to changes in orthography and phonology,the morphology and syntax
of Uzbek were also modified, or “improved” by borrowing grammatical concepts from
Russian, the “most international” language(Fierman, 1991:163).

Compulsory Study ofRussian in Schools

In 1938, the Soviet leaders mandated the study of Russian in all non-Russian
educational institutions but claimed that it was the Uzbek prerogative to increase the
presence of Russian in Uzbekistan. In the late 1930s, Uzbeks understood that Russian
was “the most revolutionary and progressive of all the world’s languages,” and
newspapers reported that non-Russians wished to learn Russian to enjoy the writings of
Lenin, Stalin, Pushkin and Gorkii in their original forms(Fierman, 1991:136).

No law declared it as an official state language, but Russian was the unofficial
state language of Uzbekistan and the other Muslim Republics. The language was used as
a uniting bond among the various communities of peoples within the Soviet Union. It
was

no longer studied as a foreign language in schools, but as the major topic in

education. It was not meant to be solely a language of interethnic communication, but a
“second mother tongue ofthe Soviet peoples”(Landau,2001: 55-6).
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When Soviet leaders implemented the mandatory study ofRussian for all
nationalities, the Central Committee ofthe Communist Party of Uzbekistan and the
Council of People’s Commissar executed this in two separate policies on April 3 and 4,
1938. The legislation required the instruction ofthe Russian language to begin on
September 1, the first day ofthe new school year. Though leaders ofthe UzSSR had
already passed resolutions to begin Russian instruction, there were not enough resources
to realize these resolutions. In an effort to generate necessary resources before the
September 1 deadline, an intensive training program for more than 2,400 teachers was
created. This intensive training did produce qualified instructors ofRussian; many
complained at their lack of knowledge in Russian. Textbooks were also necessary for
instruction, and these and educational materials were not widely available. The goal of
the USSR was to begin Russian in primary and secondary schools, adding more Russian
to the curriculum with each passing year. The 1938 legislation, however,required that
Russian instruction begin at all grade levels, but textbooks needed for students in higher
grades had not been taken into account(Grenoble, 2003:147-8).

In primary schools, the instruction of Uzbek continued as well as in a number of
specialized areas of higher education. But in general, non-Russian languages no were no
longer the main concern ofthe USSR,and the progress under korenizatsiia began to
regress rapidly (Grenoble, 2003:147).

In time, instruction in Russian began so early in a child’s educational career and
consisted of such a large part ofthe curriculum that it differed very little from Russian
instruction in the Russian SFSR(Lewis, 1972: 216). Russification, no longer a pretext
for creating a strong, unitary Soviet society, was clearly elevated not only on the
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linguistic and education levels, but in a concerted effort by the Soviet Union to remove
the collective national memory of all peoples in the Union(Landau, 2001: 55-6).

Results of Language Policy under Stalin

Under Stalin, Russian came to replace the local languages in most spheres. It was
the language of the government, industrial and commercial enterprises, medicine,
transport and communications, specialized secondary schools and colleges, especially in
technological, engineering and medical studies and in the training of many specialists.
The result was the reduction oflocal languages and their cultures. Bilingualism became
more common, but it was an unequal bilingualism. The natives of Uzbekistan learned
Russian, but the Russians made no effort to learn the local languages. Among Uzbek
intelligentsia, an extensive transition to Russian was observed. The result was a dramatic
increase in literacy and a greater ethnolinguistic awareness among the republics’ various
ethnic groups(Landau, 2001: 52-3).

As a result of Stalin’s language policy and the emigration of Russians to
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics, Russian gained priority both officially and
practically. The role of Russian grew due to a greater presence ofthe language, the
influence of Russian on the Uzbek language itself, compulsory study of Russian in all
schools and the preferential treatment given to Russian speakers. Stalin believed that the
mandatory study of Russian would be most successful in heightening the status ofthe
language, but this policy was hastily executed and language planners will ill-prepared to
provide the necessary resources to make the study ofRussian successful. Though status
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of the language grew, it was due to factors other than the simple act ofadding Russian to
the curriculum.

In the first decade, mandatory instruction of Russian in non-Russian schools was
far less successful than language planners had hoped. Instructors generally did not know
Russian or the native language well enough to explain grammatical concepts to students;
this problem was compounded by the lack of prepared educational materials, such as
textbooks. Russian was meant to be taught through the native language in the early
grades of primary school and expanded upon with each passing year(Lewis, 1972: 215).
Before Cyrillicization, textbooks, which tried to keep pace with the oft-changing
orthography of Uzbek terms, were already often out-of-date not long after being
published. Once Cyrillic became the new alphabet for Uzbeks,textbooks once again
became obsolete. Even for the short time that textbooks corresponded with the most
recent update ofthe language,there were far too few (Fierman, 1991:199).

The heightened status of Russian and mandatory mstruction ofthe language
caused an increase in the number of Uzbek children attending Russian language schools.
By the mid-1940s, 10 percent of children in Uzbekistan attended Russian language
schools. Though some ofthese changes can be accounted for by Russian emigration Russians would, of course, send their children to Russian language schools-the number
of Russian immigrants did not correspond equally with the number of children in these
schools. Natives opted to send their children to Russian schools rather than national
language schools because minority schools were fewer in number and Russian held
favored status even in non-Russian schools. Nearly three times as many children enrolled
in Russian language schools than Russian children were present(Lewis, 1972: 197-8).
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Uzbek parents also felt that if their children would be required to study Russian in
both national and Russian schools, it was more logical to enroll their children in a
Russian school so their entire schooling would be in Russian. If knowledge of Russian
would help advance their children in the future, it made more sense for children to know
it as well as possible. Parents soon came to view the quality oftheir children’s education
based on their skill in Russian, and proficiency in Russian was expected upon the
completion of secondary education. Due to this logic, parents began to consider
instruction in Russian in secondary schools not as unavoidable, but as natural. This point
of view facilitated the increase in the status of Russian, and once this logic was in place,
it was difficult to stop (Lewis, 1972:198).

Stalin’s policies did increase the status of Russian, but it should be noted that the
spread of Russian was not due solely to these policies. Along with the official rise in
status of Russian and the Russification ofthe Turkic languages came an influx of Russian
speakers. In Uzbekistan, Russian emigration increased drastically starting in 1945 and
continuing over the course ofthe next two decades. Russian emigration was encouraged
by Communist leaders to facilitate development in Uzbekistan. The need for experts in a
number of fields far exceeded the available supply. Russian experts were necessary to
train the natives in these modem professions. Without these experts, Uzbekistan and the
other Central Asian republics would never achieve modernization. Russians took
advantage oftheir growing numbers and heightened status oftheir language. The
presence of Russian emigrants ensured that Russian was necessary to read Russian
literature and publications, which were also multiplying. Knowledge of Russian became
a cmcial skill for any native hoping for advancement in any political, military, economic.
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scientific or educational fields. The 1938 language policy intended for Russian to be
crucial for any sort of career advancement, and in this aspect, it succeeded (Landua,
2001:36).

Up to 1941, educated Uzbek specialists consisted of only 15 percent ofthose
employed in positions that required such qualifications. Few Uzbeks had a higher
education, but those who did much greater opportunities ifthey could fimction in a
Russian environment(Fierman, 1991: 200). By the end ofthe 1930s, a generation of
Uzbeks studied Russian with the knowledge that proficiency was required to become
politically or economically successful(Bacon, 1966:195). Though officially no
preference was given to Russian-speakers in Uzbekistan, Soviet policy granted more
opportunities to Russian-speakers than non-Russians(Fierman, 1991:269).
The heightened status of Russian also affected the Uzbek language. Soviet
language planners hoped to improve upon the “primitive” Uzbek language by enriching
the vocabulary with “international” terms, mostly of Russian origin. In the mid-1920s,
only 4 percent ofthe Uzbek language consisted of Russian international words, but by
1934, that amount had tripled to 12 percent, and in 1940 15 percent of Uzbek consisted of
Russian loan vocabulary (Fierman, 1991: 162).
A large amount of Russian words had entered into everyday speech. Even
peasants and nomads used the term kolkhoz, because it was a concept which they had not
known before Soviet times. Likewise, peasants ofthe oasis region used the term pomidor
to describe tomatoes because they were introduced to the concept of“tomato” by the
Russians. A nomad used the term brigad because it was a specific institution from which
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he draws his paycheck. Language planners had hoped that such nomads and peasants
would come into contact with many more Russian concepts and add the corresponding
terms to their vocabulary, and that the use of published works, publications and radio
broadcasts would further promote Russian words until they entered into the vocabulary of
all members of non-Russian nationalities(Bacon, 1966:197).

The influx of Russian loan words created a gap between the standard written and
spoken language of Uzbek and other Turkic languages. In instances in which Turkic
speakers already utilized a certain word for a given concept or did not entirely understand
or accept the concept, the Turkic term remained in use. Central Asian intelligentsia
protested the changes in their language, while Communist leaders repeatedly assured
Turkic speakers that their language was being improved. However,though Soviet leaders
tried to replace the vocabulary of Uzbek with Russian terms,they were largely
unsuccessful in eliminating many Uzbek terms. Thousands of“international” words
entered Uzbek, but the language mostly maintained its former terminology by simply
applying Russian loan words to a given concept but using their own words for other
meanings of that concept(Bacon, 1966: 198).

It is difficult to say just how much of Central Asian languages were changed as a
result of Russification, due to an abundance of written resources and a lack of oral
resources. Dictionaries and publications were not accurate portrayals ofthe way in which
language was used in everyday interactions. In speech, only the intelligentsia employed
the “standard” forms of their languages in conversations, while most Central Asians
simply used their own regional dialects. The standard language differed so greatly from
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common speech that a number of Uzbek authors include glossaries to define terms for
their readers, who may or may not know “standard” forms(Bacon, 1966:197).

One final effect of Stalin’s policy of Cyrillicization was to accomplish one ofthe
longstanding goals ofthe Soviet Union -the eradication ofilliteracy. Literacy drastically
increased over the lifespan ofthe USSR. In Uzbekistan,the literacy rate between the
ages of9 and 49 rose from 11.6 percent in 1926 to 78.7 percent in 1939 to 98.1 percent in
1959. Literacy, therefore, was not only increasing, it was increasing generationally. The
literacy of Uzbek males increased from 15.3 percent in 1926 to 83.6 percent in 1939 to
98.8 percent in 1959. Literacy among Uzbek females also increased during this time,
from 7.3 percent in 1926 to 73.3 percent in 1939 and 99.0 percent in 1959(Lewis, 1972:
175).

Following Stalin’s language policy, the influence of Russian could be seen in
virtually every sphere language was used. Uneven bilingualism developed fi*om the
greater role of Russian - bilingualism was primarily literate, and without its continuous
presence in educational institutions and schools, Russian would not maintain its higher
status. Bilingualism was also uneven in the sense that Russians made no effort to learn
the local languages, which already had a strong base in the region, while natives were
required to learn Russian as a rule and to succeed in any professional pursuits(Lewis,
1972: 216). The settings and structures necessary for Russification were in place, and the
role of Russian would continue to grow in the future decades(Landau,2001: 36).

40

Chapter III: Language Policy under Khruschev

Language Policy under Khnischev: Its Purpose and Goals

In the late 1930s, class struggle had ceased to be an issue. To maintain the
sentiment of a continuing revolution, Stalin had replaced class enemies with ethnic
enemies through ethnic stratification. From 1941 to 1944, seven entire nationalities were
accused of a German alliance and were exiled to Siberia and Central Asia. Relocation
was not a new concept in the USSR,but this marked a change in its practice -these
enemies were not political dissidents and were found guilty based on their ethnicity rather
than their actions. Stalin endorsed nationalities as the new “exploiting class” and
continued to use the model of class struggle to preserve ethnic division and to promote
Russian as the superior ethnicity (Zisserman-Brodsky,2003:25).

Under Stalin’s regime, the term “ethnicity” came to signify more than ethnic or
cultural identity. Internal passports became mandatory and provided information ofthe
individual’s nationality/ethnicity. Since the Soviet leadership continued to determine
ethnicity based largely on one’s “native language”(a classification that was in itself
ambiguous, since citizens themselves determined which language they considered their
“native language”),this form of ethnic repression went hand in hand v^th linguistic
repression. The information provided in these passports meant that an individual could
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officially be granted additional freedoms or deprived ofrights based on one’s ethmcity.
“Great Russian chauvinism” had been discarded as a threat, while “bourgeois
nationalism” had become the new peril. Russians were presented as the ideal, a model
for which all other nationalities must strive, while other nationalities were a perceived
threat - their ideals, which they innately held as members of a given ethmcity, could
corrupt the Russians(Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003:24-5).

When Nikita Kruschev succeeded Stalin in 1953,these ethnic issues remained
from Stalin’s reign of terror. During the “thaw,” a period ofrelative freedom following
Stalin’s regime, Soviet leaders attempted to distance themselves from such extremes of
Stalin’s nationality and language policies(Zisserman-Brodsky,2003:25).

BChruschev’s motives in constructing language policies were much simpler and
less ambiguous than those of his predecessors. In the aftermath of Stalin’s prejudices
against nationalities, Khruschev sought to create an egalitarian society without additional
rights or privileges granted or withheld based on nationality and to erase the lines that
separated various nationalities and to unify the USSR in the spirit of Communism: only
through equality and unity could small-nation nationalism be overcome. In 1961,the new
Program ofthe Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union,recognized this and the need for
reforms in nationality policies(Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003:26).

Khruschev’s language policy focused on Russification as necessary for
international communication and a major step toward overcoming national diversity
(Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003: 26). No longer would the national languages be the center of
focus; Russian was the solitary language ofcommunication in the Soviet Union. The use
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of one language among all peoples would serve as a major source of unification for
Soviet citizens not as a symbol, but as a basic medium for communication across all
nations. Khruschev did not want Russian to be the “second mother tongue” ofthe USSR
like Stalin, who hoped to instill an emotional attachment to the language through his
policies. Khruschev focused instead on the pragmatic benefits oflinguistic Russification.

In principle, the use of non-Russian languages was supported but tended to be
viewed as superfluous. The Khruschev leadership was the first to openly judge the
relative value of minority languages; languages with lower status and those with few
speakers in a region were no longer considered worth developing or worth instruction m
schools. While ethnic languages were still permitted, it was no longer the responsibility
ofthe Soviet leaders to promote them (Grenoble, 2003: 57).

Khruschev ultimately hoped to develop a common Soviet identity using the
Russian language. Through the promotion of Russian not as the major language, but as
the language ofthe Soviet Union, he hoped to erase the borders and boimdaries
separating non-Russians and Russians(Fierman, 1985: 257-8).

For the first time in Soviet history, compulsory non-Russian education was no
longer required. Children had the option ofstudying in their native language if resources
permitted, but resources for Russian would always be available. The admimstration
promoted Russian monolingualism in education; by ensuring that Russian-language
education was available in all areas but not native-language education, many would have
no choice but to enroll in Russian institutions.
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Process of Language Policy under Khruschev

The changes in language policy under Khruschev were far less remarkable than
under Lenin and Stalin. No language reforms took place,though Russian gained priority
as a language. The Russian language, rather than non-Russian languages, became the
center offocus(Fierman, 1991: 148-9).

The policy ofsblizheniye, or drawing together ofthe Soviet Union, meant that
ethnic groups were evaluated for their relative importance and distinction from other
ethnic groups. Those ethnic groups with few members or whose culture seemed very
similar to that of another ethnic group were no longer granted official status by the Soviet
government(Fierman, 1985: 258).

During the comparatively liberal leadership of Khruschev, policies ofethmc
stratification, which Stalin so severely enforced, did not diminish. Though Khruschev
criticized Stalin’s stratification - a method used even by the Bolshevik government in its
nation-building process - he would also utilize it. Ethnic stratification had been a major
factor in the creation and system ofthe Soviet Union; nationalities were granted higher or
lower relative status and their territories were classified accordingly. Languages were
categorized, evaluated and judged whether they were suitable for development based

on

the status their nationalities held and the number ofspeakers in a given region.

Central Asia, which consisted offive union republics, held the highest official
status non-Russian nationalities could achieve. Other territories, such as autonomous
republics, oblasts and okrugs held a lower status and therefore received fewer rights as
members of a nationality. The Central Asian republics enjoyed the heightened status of
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their respective nationalities and were able to maintain their standing as unique ethnic
groups.

In his attempts to raise the status ofRussian to the “second native language,’
Khruschev promoted it as the “language ofinternational communication” and encouraged
the voluntary use of national languages,though they were not ensured further
development by the government.

Educational reforms in 1958-9 granted parents the option ofchoosing which
language their children would be educated in and whether they would study the native
language in schools. Native languages were already diminishing as the medium of
instruction in non-Russian schools. At the first All-Union Conference on the instruction
of Russian as a second language, speakers emphasized the necessity ofthe native
language in education, but also noted the importance of starting Russian instruction by
the first grade. Despite the emphasis on the early study of Russian, Russian was not
glorified but seen as a practical, necessary language for communication, science and
technology and the better understanding ofRussian and world culture. Non-Russian
languages were no longer seen as a threat but as an inconvenience, and many languages
were permitted to reintroduce vocabulary which previous administrations had done away
with. In Uzbek,this meant that Arabic and Persian words reentered the language
(Sengupta, 2003:149).

The Education Reforms stated that native language education was no longer
required. At the time, native language instruction was instructed in written form
throughout primary school and in some cases continued to the secondary level. Since
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Russian instruction began as early as possible in schools,the native language v^as
replaced entirely by Russian in a number of institutions. This occurred more rapidly in
some institutions than others. In native-language schools, Russian remained a part ofthe
required curriculum (Grenoble, 2003: 57).

In the late 1950s, Uzbek words previously eliminated from the language were
once more returned. Uzbek vocabulary, which had for the most part been replaced by its
Russian counterpart, was classified in dictionaries as identical in meaning with the
Russian term. Additionally, many Turkic, Persian and Arabic terms were reintroduced
into the langauge (Fierman, 1991: 261).

Native-language instruction continued because educators faced obstacles caused
by linguistic biases in teaching. Educators were expected to teach much more than time
in the classroom permitted, and due to the amount oftime devoted to language study,the
other areas of study, such as science, were suffering. As a result, it was necessary that
parents choose the language ofinstruction and which language should be studied as a
foreign language when such choices applied. Though Khruschev emphasized the
importance of Russian as a language of culture and international communication, he also
stated that parents should be granted the option ofrequesting that their children not be
taught Russian in native-language schools. Similarly, parents of students in Russian
language schools should be permitted to not have their children study the native language
(Lewis, 1972: 76).
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Results of Language Policy under Khruschev

Khruschev continued the process of ethnic stratification but manipulated it for his
own purposes. The combination ofthe continued differentiation of nationalities and the
essential loss oftheir official cultural-linguistic status meant that Soviet leaders were able
to maintain a perfect balance ofcontrol over the peoples ofthe USSR- Moscow was
clearly in charge, but its policies were not so extreme that they would become a major
source of tension. Though the political environment remained stable, many nationalities
were upset at the loss oftheir ethnic identities and became ideologically opposed to the
Soviet system (Zisserman-Brodsky,2003: 29).

Without employing the extremes of

cultural and linguistic control that characterized Stalin’s administration. Russification,
though effective throughout much ofthe USSR, was met with little success in Uzbekistan
and other Central Asian republics with the exclusion of Kazakhstan. Khruschev was
forced to accept the current situation or risk unrest among nationalities(Fierman, 1991:
267).

Though it did not succeed as well as had been hoped in becoming the second
language of all Central Asian nationalities, the subtle manner in which it was
implemented and the cultural fireedoms granted for the use ofnational languages would
make it easier for further Russification to occur in the future regime. Khruschev’s
language and nationalities policies were by no means democratic, but the freedom they
permitted in comparison to the former administrations had great influence on the ethmc
communities. These policies released a large amount ofthe control of culture
(Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003: 27). Many nationalities were upset at the loss ofthe native
language as mandatory in education, but the restoration ofsome ofthe main
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characteristics of their own language, such as the reinstitution ofloanwords of nonEuropean origin kept discontent at a minimum.

The role of Russian grew in the Uzbek SSR as a result ofRussification; however,
Soviet leaders viewed Russification in the republic essentially as a failure. This is due to
a number of factors. The strong attachment ethnic groups held with their native
languages caused many parents to continue to send their children to non-Russian schools;
this connection may have been strengthened by the discontent caused by the eradication
ofthe native languages as a compulsory part ofthe curriculum in Russian-langmge
schools. Additionally, Uzbek tended to hold higher status than many ofthe other Central
Asian languages. This is evidenced by the comparatively high number of Slavs and
Europeans who gained some knowledge ofthe language; many Europeans considered the
local languages to be primitive and of no benefit. In Uzbekistan, Russians were generally
able to count and used Uzbek greetings(Dave, 2004:127). The comparatively high
status of Uzbek combined with a declining number of students in Russian- language
institutions meant that the status of Russian could not be heightened as well as Soviet
leaders had hoped.

Uzbekistan was only one oftwo republics that saw a decrease in the number of
children attending Russian-language schools. Though the administration introduced
education reforms as a conscious attempt to increase fluency in Russian among all
nationalities, little attention was paid to its effectiveness as a policy. In Uzbekistan, for
example,few students enrolled in Russian-language schools, and in native-language
schools the subject of Russian was not a priority. Because ofthis, Uzbeks between the
ages of20 and 29 who did not graduate secondary or post-secondary educational
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institutions had a 20 percent higher fluency in Russian than those that had (Fierman,
1991:265).

In Uzbekistan, the large number of schools that provided instruction in a nonRussian language combined with a high percentage of students enrolled in these schools.
In 1955, only 298 of schools within the republic offered instruction in Russian, while an
overwhelming 5,098 used a non-Russian language as the means ofinstruction. Eighty
percent of students were enrolled in a native-language school, in contrast to the 20
percent enrolled in Russian-language schools. Further proof ofthe failure of
Russification can be found in the growing Uzbek population and the high number of
Uzbeks who continued to claim Uzbek as their native language. The ethmc Uzbek
population comprised 62.2 percent ofthe total population in 1950 and grew to 68.7
percent in 1979, of which 98.5 percent claimed Uzbek as their native language(Grenoble,
2003: 158).

The lack of enrollment was an enormous obstacle for Russification. Because of
the few number of students in Russian schools, Uzbeks between the ages of20 and 29
who did not graduate secondary or post-secondary educational institutions had a 20
percent higher fluency in Russian than those that had(Fierman, 1991:265).

Without employing the extremes of cultural and linguistic control that
characterized Stalin’s administration, Khruschev’s language policy of Russification,
though effective throughout much ofthe USSR, was met with little success in Uzbekistan
and other Central Asian republics with the exclusion of Kazakhstan. Without these
methods, Khruschev was forced to accept the current language situation enjoyed by the
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cultural elite or risk unrest among nationalities (Fierman, 1991:267). However,
Khruschev’s policies had laid the foundation for the next Soviet premier, who would
redouble efforts at Russification.
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Chapter IV; Language Policy under Brezhnev

Language Policy under Brezhnev: Its Purpose and Goals

The Brehznev administration, which lasted from 1964 to 1982,followed the same
basic principles as those of Khruschev. Under Brezhnev,the campaign for Russification
and measures to ensure its effectiveness were intensified, and there was a renewed
movement to instill Russian as the “second mother tongue” ofthe Soviet people
(Grenoble, 2003: 58).

One of the major objectives was to forge a new identity for Soviet citizens into a
“Soviet” nationality, or sovetskii narod. This concept differed from previous efforts of
unification in that Soviet, rather than Russian, was seen as a national identity. Brezhnev
hoped to eliminate the differences among nationalities which divided the Soviet state and
proposed the formation of all nationalities into one main nationality: Soviet. He promoted
the idea of“the convergence and fusion of peoples” {slizhbeniye i sliianiye narodov).
His vision for the future ofthe USSR was shared at the 1971 Party Congress, describing
the potential of a Soviet nationality as consisting of“the new human community sharing
a common territory, state, economic system, culture, the goal of building communism and
a common language”(Grenoble,2003: 58-9).
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Despite this, the non-Russian nationalities still sought to establish their nonSoviet identity. Past policies had succeeded in Russification to some extent, but had also
caused many nationalities to cling to what remained oftheir language, both in corpus and
status. Russification had created an environment in which nationalities become more
attached to their own language rather than Russian. One key reason nationalities held so
tightly to their own languages was to ensure the language remained a governmental
priority and was granted the resources to ensure its continued existence. Funding and
resources for all Soviet ventures were at an all-time low, and the government allocated

as

little as possible toward ethnic languages. Russification, however, continued to hold
precedence and efforts and fimding toward it increased(Grenoble,2003: 59).

The Brezhnev era was characterized by the additional elevation of status ofthe
Russian language. The language provided the common bond that would bring all peoples
together into the sovetskii narod. Without increased use ofthe language, the dream of
Soviets as a nationality could never be realized.

Brezhnev’s language policy focused on centralization ofthe USSR. His policies
aimed at mutual accommodation,the careful balance of national languages(which

were

unlikely to disappear entirely, despite the most stringent Russification measures) used

to

celebrate individual cultures and to provide an enriching environment for the Union as a
whole, and the accepted dominance of Russian in everyday communication. Though the
government leaders no longer provided much cause for alarm, minority languages were
seen as superfluous: an aspect of culture that diversified the state but served no practical
purpose. Russian was to become the language and replace all non-Russian languages in
most spheres. This theoretical preservation ofthe national languages combined with
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intense Russification was called the theory of merging, oxsliyaniye. Sliyaniye was
Brezhnev’s fundamental goal and the purpose for constructing language policies which,
though lacking creativity, provided an ideal environment for further Russification (Lewis,
1972: 88).

Process of Language Policy under Brezhnev

The Brezhnev era saw Russian increasingly replacing the native language as the
medium of instruction in schools. Though Russification under Khruschev had resulted
in more Russian speakers, it did not entirely achieve its desired result. The level of
fluency of non-native Russian speakers was also a topic ofconcern, and with Russian
now considered to be “the common language of all Soviet citizens,” Communist leaders
needed to devise a plan that would result in a wider use of Russian. First steps to create
more speakers with greater fluency began in 1968, when a research institute for teaching
Russian as a second language was organized in Moscow (Sengupta,2003:149-150).

In the following years, the Brezhnev administration remained concerned by the
poor command of Russian exhibited by many non-Russians of various levels of
schooling. In 1975, an All-Union conference in Tashkent was held for the specific
purpose of addressing the issue of Russian instruction at all levels ofeducation(Fierman,
1991:265).

At this time, a new method ofteaching Russian was designed to address the needs
of non-Russians which focused on the teaching ofthe language in its context. Through
this approach, non-Russians become acclimated both to the language and the socialist
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system of Soviet Russia and would become more Russified both in fluency oflanguage
and the society. The method helped enforce the idea that ethnic language was
unnecessary to preserve the ethnic culture and had no functional use into the Soviet
Union (Sengupta, 2003: 150).

Under Brezhnev, the amount of curriculum devoted to the instruction ofRussian
increased even to the point ofreplacing the native languages in national schools and the
number of Russian-language institutions also increased. The 1977 Constitution made it
clear that Russification would only intensify at the expense of ethnic languages in Article
36, which stated that Soviet citizens would be granted the '"opportunity for the school
instruction of their native language” as opposed to the 1936 Constitution, which ensured
a right to instruction in their native language(Grenoble,2003: 58).

In October 1978, the plan for Russification was additionally solidified by Decree
no. 835, titled “On Measures for Further Improving the Study and Teaching ofthe
Russian Language in the Union Republics.” The decree mandated new syllabi for the
study of Russian and new educational resources for native-language schools,the
retraining of instructors of Russian, greater use of Russian as a medium ofinstruction for
a number of subjects, and language resource centers for all educational institutions.
Russian-language instruction was also to begin earlier; Decree no. 835 mandated that all
preschools would provide Russian instruction (Grenoble,2003: 58).
In 1979, the campaign for Russification reached full force. The All-Union
conference met in Tashkent once more and allocated funds for new curriculum
development, new equipment for language laboratories, the implementation of Russian
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subjects of study into native-language schools, creating smaller Russian-language classes
and increasing the amount of curriculum devoted to Russian language(Fierman, 1991:
265).

Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmen and other Central Asians were encouraged to
continue their language as part of their culture and use Russian for all communicative
purposes. The Brezhnev administration claimed a deep interest in preserving ethnic
languages, but the extremes of Russification implemented and the diminished funding for
development contradicted this. Russian was superior of all languages and would continue
to be enforced as such (Lewis, 1972, 89).

Results of Language Policy under Brezhnev

The effectiveness of Brezhnev’s policy of increased Russification can be
measured both quantitatively and qualitatively, based on the number of students enrolled
in Russian-language schools, the amount of Russian offered in such schools and the
percentage of publications per language.

Statistically, Russification in Uzbekistan failed. Uzbek generally remained the
medium of instruction in schools, and in the years 1967-8, the vast majority ofstudents of
both primary and secondary institutions received their education in Uzbek.

Of the

2,621,503 students, an overwhelming 1,805,284 received education in their native
language - over 99 percent. In 1970, at 2.6 million, more students were enrolled in
native-language schools in the republic of Uzbekistan than existed ethnic Uzbek children
- that is to say, ethnic Tajiks and other nationalities living in Uzbekistan were also
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enrolled in their own native language schools. Ethnic Uzbeks did attend Russian schools,
but a greater number of minorities in the republic enrolled in Uzbek-language schools.
As late as 1985, 70 percent of Uzbek-language schools offered only Uzbek as the
language of instruction, while another 10 percent offered both Russian and Uzbek as the
medium for teaching. In primary and secondary educational institutions, Uzbek was the
language with the most significance. Past the secondary level, however, most institutions
offered courses only in Russian (Fierman, 1991: 262).

Uzbek also retained its position a language in print, though Russian was the
language of technical and academic publications. In 1960, only 15.2 million books were
printed in the Uzbek language. By 1965, that number had grown to 18.6 million.
Publications for 1980 totaled 22.9 million, while 1981 saw 27.1 million. Though Uzbek
prevailed as a language in publications, which grew rather than dimimshed under
Brezhnev’s Russification, the percentage of Russian-language materials soon exceeded
those of Uzbek. In 1960, 75 percent of publications were written in Uzbek; by the end of
the administration in 1984 this number had dropped to only 51 percent. Additionally,
though Uzbek publications grew in number, the increase in publications was not
congruent to the increase in population. From 1959 to 1979,the ethmc Uzbek population
of Uzbekistan soared from 5.0 million to 10.6 million. Publications per capita dropped
from 3.00 in 1970 to just 2.16 in 1980(Fierman, 1991:263)

The 1979 census indicated the incredible rise in Russian fluency by ethmc Uzbeks
of the Uzbek SSR: in less than 10 years, the rate of Russian fluency had quadrupled
(Fierman, 1991: 265). However, bilingualism in the Soviet Union remained uneven.
Only 3 percent of Russians claimed bilingualism, while a substantial 40 percent of non56

Russians claimed to be fluent in at least two languages. In 1979,82 percent ofthe total
population of the USSR claimed to know some level of Russian; the Russian population
at this time was only slightly more than 50 percent Translations ofnative-language
works were rarely translated into Russian, though Russian works were often translated
into the national languages. Russian clearly retained status as the superior language
(Grenoble, 2003: 58).

The status of Russian rose substantially in the Brezhnev era. Russian spread to
nearly all spheres of communication, even within local administration. More and more,it
became the medium of international communication. The langxiage had changed from a
medium of communication to a symbol ofthe Soviet state (Grenoble, 2003: 58-9).

Though the Russification ofthe Brezhnev administration further heightened the
status of Russian in Uzbekistan, it did not do so at the expense of Uzbek; Russification is
generally regarded as a failure in the Uzbek SSR because ofthis. Though Uzbeks were
willing to learn Russian, as indicated by the substantial increase offluency in the
language during this era, they were not willing to allow Russian to be symbolically
glorified. The new system of education attempted to Russify the masses, which provided
exercises ofthe language in everyday context, promoted the idea that Russian, rather than
Uzbek, should be the language ofinteraction and the overall language ofculture ofthe
Soviet state. This is reaffirmed by the uneven bilingualism which occurred in literary
works of Uzbek, which were generally not translated into Russian and the few Russians
that made an effort to learn the local languages. Russian culture been more forcefully
asserted as the supreme culture through its language policies, and Uzbeks,in response,
only held tighter to their language. In the end ofthe Brezhnev era, Uzbeks and other
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non-Russians began their demands for the equal roles oflanguage and “two-way
bilingualism. These attitudes would present problems in the Gorbachev era, when
language policy would be forced to undergo an extreme transformation(Sengupta, 2003:
i

150).

I

i
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Chapter V: Language Policy under Gorbachev

Language Policy under Gorbachev: Its Purpose and Goals

When Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary ofthe Communist
Party of the Soviet Union,the effects of Russification under Khruschev and Brezhnev
could clearly be seen. Russian bilingualism was high, and the majority of Soviet citizens
had at least some knowledge for Russian. In many areas, there was a marked move
towards Russian as a language. Many citizens, however,feared what Russification could
mean for their language and culture in the future, and dissatisfaction was developed
among the nationalities(Grenoble, 2003: 62-3).

Policies of the Soviet state differed in content but shared one main theme: ethnic
groups must be contained. For the duration ofthe USSR,language policies were used to
subdue nationalist sentiments and to reaffirm that it was the Russian leadership that held
control over all nationalities (Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003: 16). Discontent among ethnic
groups was a problem easily solved by the formula of“propaganda, coercion and
repression.

This was a hallmark of all Soviet language policy: any perceived issue

among the nationalities could be easily be remedied with new legislation directing new
reforms for language. In the first years ofrule, language policy tmder Gorbachev
remained as it had been during the Brezhnev administration. Since there was no apparent
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unrest among the nationalities, there was no reason to change the policy(ZissermanBrodsky, 2003: 31).

Rather than alter language policy, Gorbachev instead focused on political reforms
such as glasnost ’ or “openness,” which called for an end to corruption and the right to
express discontent with the government. Under glasnost\ Uzbek citizens were for the
first time met with the opportunity to fight for their ethnic rights.

Language was considered to be a key identifying factor of ethnicity by nonRussians of the Uzbek SSR. As Uzbek and other languages were continually relegated to
a lower status, Russian gained prominence, and many felt that both their language and
culture had been demoted. Glasnost’ provided an open forum for Uzbeks to express their
dissatisfaction over language policy not only ofthat time, but ofover 60 years of Soviet
rule. As their freedom to speak out against such policies was granted,the aggression
built up over years of Soviet rule came to a forefi*ont.

Uzbek leaders expressed a growing concern that Uzbek and other minority
languages were continuing to deteriorate and faced a very real danger of extinction,
which many equated to be the extinction of an entire culture. They contested the
unreasonably high status Russian held over Uzbek,citing examples of basic tasks that
required knowledge of Russian, though Russians constituted only a small percentage of
the population. An Uzbek poet at a writer’s conference shared an experience at the
Uzbek Central Committee in which he assisted an Uzbek shepherd who spoke no
Russian; the receptionist there did not speak Uzbek. Uzbeks were reminded that in the
event of an emergency, a telephone call for emergency services could only be conducted
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in Russian. Mail addressed in Uzbek was returned with a note instructing ""Ukazhite
adresV" or “Indicate the address!”(Lapidus, 1992:50).

In addition to the difficulty of accomplishing basic tasks in Uzbek, Uzbeks had
begun to realize how different their language and other Turkic languages had become.
The Turkic languages now varied so much they were no longer mutually intelligible. The
Turkic peoples of the Central Asian republics were able to communicate with each only
in Russian (Lapidus, 1992: 51). In the era ofglasnost’, Uzbeks aggressively sought to
reclaim their pre-Soviet heritage, or what remained ofit. Movements for the restoration
of the status of their language had become highly politicized(Zisserman-Brodsky, 2003:
31)

The Process of Language Policy under Gorbachev

Until

1989, both language and nationality policies remained essentially

unchanged from previous years; they received little attention from the central government
in Moscow. Perestroika, a policy of political and economic reform, inevitably followed
glastnost. ’ As individual republics were granted the right to speak out against Soviet
policies, the question of sovereignty arose. Perestroika delegated more political power to
the municipal level and awarded more freedom to the citizens of its non-Russian
territories to prevent secession from the USSR.

In the following years, discontent would only increase. By 1987, the year in
which Gorbachev implemented perestroika, violent uprisings by such Uzbek nationalist
groups as Birlik rallied for the promotion of Uzbek to a state language (Chinn, 1996:
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223). As nationalist uprisings continued and states called for demands of elevation of
their language to the status of state language, Soviet leaders held the option of granting
greater independence to the republics or risking an increasingly aggressive non-Russian
population.

The administration saw no choice but to give in to these demands,and on October
21,1989 the Uzbek SSR was permitted to pass Law ofthe Uzbek SSR on Languages,
officially elevating Uzbek to the status of a state language. The Uzbek language law
provided for an eight-year transition to Uzbek, created solely for the purpose of allowing
Russians time to learn Uzbek. Also, many Uzbeks were more fluent in Russian than in
Uzbek. A quick switch to the titular language would be extremely difficult for all
members of Uzbekistan’s population (Kolstoe, 1995: 222).

The Law of the Uzbek SSR on Languages did not have the intended result of
suppressing nationalist sentiments and failed to strengthen the weakening Soviet state.
To create a common bond once more among the nationalities, Soviet leaders created the
Law on the Languages ofthe Peoples ofthe Soviet Union. This law, passed on April 24,
1990, was a final attempt to maintain the common Russian linguistic space, and stated
officially that Russian was to be the official language ofinter-ethnic communication,
though it was no longer to be taught as a primary language in the Soviet Republics
(Landau, 2001: 62).

62

Results of Language Policy under Gorbachev

Once the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian in theory became no longer necessary
as the inter-ethnic and international language of the Muslim republics. The concept of
the “Soviet language"’ began to diminish, and the titular languages of each republic began
replacing Russian loan words Russian with their own terms(Landau,2001: 62).

Masses of Russophones began emigrating from Uzbekistan and other Central
Asian republics upon the execution of Law on State Language. In 1990, 59,700 Russians
left Uzbekistan of a total of 139,900 total emigrations from the republic (Nikolaev, 1994:
111).

Faced with no choice but adaptation, many Russians chose instead to leave.

Furthermore, many Russians anticipated discrimination in employment (Gleason, 1997:
346).

Though Uzbek held the position of state language, many factors would affect the
role of Russian in the years to come. Uzbek held the same status as Russian and would
continue to do so until 1997, as mandated by the Law on State Language. Even
following independence, Russian would officially retain its status as a major language of
Uzbekistan for at least some time.
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Chapter VI: Russian and Uzbek in Post-Soviet
Uzbekistan
The Republic of Uzbekistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union on
August 31, 1991, and following the collapse ofthe Soviet Union began searching to
express the ethnic identity that had been repressed under Soviet rule. Like all the exSoviet republics of Central Asia, Uzbek citizens began the search for an identity not only
to disassociate themselves from the Soviet Union, but also to separate themselves from
the other Central Asian republics in an effort to build a distinct identity for the people of
Uzbekistan. A major area offocus for Uzbek leaders was on the titular language-the
first step towards becoming truly independent would be to implement a new language
policy promoting Uzbek. Despite the fact that most attention was given to the dominant
ethnic group, the Uzbek government made an effort to not exclude their respective
minorities. In its Constitution, for example, citizens are referred to as “the people of
Uzbekistan” rather than simply “Uzbeks.” Despite these powerful declarations, the
reality of the situation was that Russians were generally excluded from such statements
(Landau, 2001: 4).

Language was considered to be more of a symbol than a means of
communication. Far more than any other factor in shaping identity, language allowed a
society to shape and maintain a sense ofunity. It was not only a statement of culture, but
also of politics, economics and religion. A state-sponsored language promoted an ethno-
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national identity, and those who spoke the language affirmed that they share this identity
and therefore belonged to that nation(Landau,2001: 5).

Despite its disdain of the heavy politicization oflanguage under the Soviet
regime, the Uzbek government has both created and enforced its own language policies.
To many Uzbeks, this represented the epitome ofindependence. For the first time in
nearly 70 years, Uzbekistan was able to create and enforce its own language policy
(Fierman, 1991:277).

Once the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian became,in theory, no longer necessary
as the inter-ethnic and international language ofthe Muslim republics. The concept of
the “Soviet language” began to diminish, with the titular languages ofeach republic
replacing loan words from Russian with their own terms(Landau,2001: 62). In
Uzbekistan, government officials faced problems with the linguistic situation. Many
wanted to distance themselves firom the language ofthe former Soviet Union; at the same
time, the establishment ofthe titular language as the new state language would cause
problems. The titular language was less familiar to the Uzbek elite; it also lacked the
technological and modem vocabulary that Russian had. Additionally, the titular language
was considered to be lower in status and poorer in corpus. Technical difficulties in the
implementation of a new state language also arose: governments needed to decide how to
reverse or reduce language shift through alphabet change and orthographic and lexical
intervention, how to introduce the new state language into school curriculum with little
funding available, and address the other critical issues facing the newly independent
states. The governments were further confi-onted by dissatisfaction among the people for
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imposing a new state language. Minority ethnic groups, especially the Russians, opposed
any language policy promoting the titular language(Landau,2001: 8).

Many Russians have already left Uzbekstan following the Law on State Language
passed in 1989 and continued to do so. In only three years,from 1989 to 1991,100,300
Russians emigrated from Uzbekistan (Kaiser, 1994: 251). Russians left in direct response
to the language law and anticipated language laws that would inevitably follow it once
the republic had become independent. The loss ofthe status oftheir language led to fears
of discrimination in employment and other areas, as well as an unwillingness to adapt to
the titular language. To an extent, these Russians were correct in their fears. Ofthe
Russians remaining, relatively few have made an effort to learn the state language, as
they see no social or economic gain from learning Uzbek(Fierman, 1991: 274).

Following independence, the ethnocentricism of Russians only increased, and
many felt that the Uzbek language was “primitive” and did not feel the need to study it.
These Russians have perpetuated the stereotype many Uzbeks held during RussificationRussians were unwilling to learn the local languages, because they view their own
language as more socially and economically viable, while the local languages have little
to offer.

The perception of Russians, interestingly, seems to be not so much based on their
nationality, but due to their inherent ties with the Russian language -as Russians, it was
their native language. The Central Asian republics, in theory, encourage bilingualism in
both the titular language and Russian, but in a study conducted in four ex-Soviet
republics, including Kazakhstan, higher preference was given to a native member ofthe
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republic who spoke Russian than to a Russian who spoke the titular language. NonRussians expressed contempt for Russian speakers attempting to conform to the norms of
a former Soviet republic. Native speakers ofthe titular language with knowledge of
Russian were the least accommodating to Russians attempting to learn the titular
language. Additionally, many Uzbeks held prejudices against the presence ofa Russian
accent in the titular language (Laitin 1998: 240-1). In general, better jobs and more
opportunities were given to Russians speaking their own language than to Russians
speaking Uzbek (Laitin, 1998: 238)

Uzbeks with a greater knowledge of Russian than ofthe titular language have also
been the object of condescension. The use of Russian by Uzbeks has been discouraged in
the titular community, and those who daily speak Russian and use it as their main
language are unkindly referred to as “mankurists.” Studies have shown that the greater
degree of bilingualism speakers of Uzbek had,the more contemptuous they were towards
Russians speaking that language. Because Uzbek/Russian bilingualism is dimimshing,
and because of the contempt they have received in trying to assimilate with their
environment, the desire for Russians to stay and attempt to adapt to their surroundings
has declined rapidly (Laitin, 1998: 242).

Russians have continued to use their own language not only out ofa beliefthat
learning the titular language is useless, due in part to the prejudice to which they will
undoubtedly be subjected, but also out of solidarity with the remaining Russian diaspora.
The Russians in post-Soviet Uzbekistan lack a strong collective identity, and though
Russians and Uzbeks have received equal treatment under the law, Uzbekistan has
become increasingly derussified at what Russians considered to be an alarming rate.
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Russians have been treated well by the government ofPresident Islam Karimov, but
should the political situation become more democraticized, Uzbek nationalists would
fight for policies to grant Russians lower status in society. Such policies would force
Russians to accept second-class citizenship or leave(Chinn,229). Their continued use of
Russian and failure to assimilate by learning the titular language,then, has been an act of
precaution. Should the current administration begin to restrict their rights as Russians,
they would have a built-in community with which to fight, with their language banding
them together.

Though the continued use oftheir language has provided them with additional
safety in an unpredictable political environment, it has also made it difficult for them to
ever truly become “people of Uzbekistan.” Through their language,they have created an
isolated, abstract community that happens to exist within the concrete borders of
Uzbekistan. Their ties to their native language have prevented them firom fully
assimilating, even when they attempt to learn and use the titular language. Their
environment prevents them from fully conforming.

In post-Soviet Uzbekistan, the Russian language itselfremains strong though
diminished. Many Uzbeks prefer to use Russian over the titular language, because they
know Russian best. Because of its convenience, many Uzbeks hope for the continued use
of Russian in Uzbekistan, unlike the nationalists campaigning for Uzbek to replace
Russian. The Uzbek intelligentsia, well-versed in Russian, understands the continued
heightened status of Russian and the higher status granted to those who speak it, even in
fields such as chemistry (Fierman, 1991: 270).
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The Uzbek intelligentsia plays a large part in the continued elevated status of
Russian. In the higher socioeconomic class and among Uzbek intelligentsia, Russian
continues to be used. Especially in urban areas, the use of Russian is prevalent. For this
reason, most of the Russian diaspora of Uzbekistan lives in Tashkent,the capital and the
most cosmopolitan city of Uzbekistan. Some Uzbeks in the city do not know Uzbek,or if
they do, they speak it only within the confines of their homes. Many Uzbeks in Tashkent
use Russian as the language for nearly every situation. In Tashkent, Russian continues to
be the language of the elite (Schreiber, 2006).

Furthermore, a number of Uzbek parents continue to send their children to
Russian schools. Even now, with Uzbek the official language of Uzbekistan, a number of
Uzbek parents believe their children will have greater advantages ifthey are educated at
Russian schools. Additionally, the Uzbek elite regard Uzbek schools as substandard and
believe that their children vvill receive a poor education at such a school and that their
diplomas will be of lesser value than those of a Russian school.

Many Uzbeks have enjoyed the higher status of Russian over Uzbek because it
worked to the advantage of Russian-speaking Uzbek intelligentsia as it had for nearly 60
years. However, most Uzbeks were not members ofthe elite, do not speak Russian and
were not given such opportunities. It was the common Uzbek from a modest background
that fought to raise the status of Uzbek. The Uzbek elite will probably continue to pursue
their education in Russian because they see it as a modem,international language, and as
a way to gain more opportunities (Laitin, 1998: 237).
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Though there remains a place for Russian in some spheres of Uzbekistan,it is not
considered a language of power and is discouraged, especially outside ofsuch cities as
Tashkent. In the villages especially, Russian is met with ill feelings. While most Uzbek
villagers are polite enough not to say anything to a Russian-speaking guest, there remains
a general feeling of resentment. Russian is considered to be a ‘horrible language.’ Many
villagers feel that Russian is no longer a language of power,and it should be entirely
from all aspects of Uzbek life (Schreiber, 2006).

The status and role of Russian continue to decline, even in urban centers. In
2001, Uzbek was the language of billboards and newspapers. Though it was possible to
buy Russian publications, especially in urban areas, Russian was no longer considered an
official language. Additionally, Russian translations were not provided for anything
written in Uzbek (Schreiber, 2006).

The continued outpouring of Russians from Uzbekistans is self-perpetuating:
because they hold such a low socioethnic status, they choose to leave. The physical
number of Russians has decreased while at the same time,the number ofUzbeks has
increased. As a result, the percentage of Russians has become drastically lower. The
relative population of Russians has been on the decline for the past 20 years and is
continuing (Shalpentokh, 1994:110). As they leave,fewer Russians remain to continue
the use of Russian. The situation for Russians worsens due to a smaller Russian
community and less use ofthe Russian language,and so more Russians choose to
emigrate.
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The alteration of the ethnic structure of Uzbekistan has also made it increasingly
complicated for Russians to guarantee their national and cultural identities. Russian is
needed and used in fewer situations, and the number of Russian cultural establishments
has also decreased (Shlapentokh, 1994:109). As these situations and establishments
decrease, it is likely that even the intelligentsia may see Uzbek schools as offering a
better chance of success in their children’s futures(Fierman 1991:275).

In favor of Russian are several factors. Though the need for Russian has
decreased much, the language remains a necessary fixture in Uzbekistan today. The
ability to speak Russian increases one’s ability to succeed in employment and education.
Russian is the only language of interethnic communication available in the Central Asian
Republics(Shlapentokh, 1994: 145). Also,there is a need for skilled Russian laborers
and for smooth trade with Russia. Ofthe Russians who choose to remain, many are
prepared to stay and campaign for cultural sovereignty rather than emigrate. The Russian
communities of the former Muslim republics, assisted in part by political figures in the
Russian Federation, have begun to coerce the governments ofCentral Asia both to
elevate the status ofthe Russian language in their states and to end their bias against
Russians(Chinn, 1996: 234).

A final factor in favor of Russian is a lack of planning for the switch to Uzbek.
As part of the derussification process, the Uzbek government mandated that Uzbek would
completely switch to Latin orthography by 2000. Many schools by that time had only
just begun to use Latin script, and course materials were still printed in Cyrillic, and most
students used and understood Cyrillic orthography more than Latin orthography. Though
Uzbekistan’s goal was to use only Latin, there was no real plan for the transition. As late
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as 2001, no rule of standardized spelling of Uzbek using the Latin alphabet existed.
Uzbeks transliterated as they felt best, which led to a number of spellings for any given
word. If the government had implemented standardized spelling, most people in
Uzbekistan were unaware of it. The implementation ofLatin was also poorly organized while a few shops had switched to the Latin script, most had not, so a strange mix of
Cyrillic and Latin existed. Though the Uzbek government had created a new language
policy, they were not very intent on effectively implementing it(Schreiber,2006).
Without a standardized written norm for Uzbek citizens to learn the language or
enforcement of the switch to the Latin alphabet, it will be difficult for Uzbek to grow as
Uzbek leaders hope.

Will Russian ever regain its elevated position in Uzbekistan? A growing number
of Russians in Uzbekistan believe that once the novelty ofindependence has fully faded,
Russian will become the major language once more. They use examples offormer
European colonies, which continue to use the language oftheir former imperialists in
various spheres, and are at times even granted the status ofstate language. Russian
remains the language of international communication in the former Central Asian
republics. The Turkic languages of Central Asia are mutually intelligible, but state
leaders use Russian in official correspondence. Uzbeks hope to use Uzbek as the
language of interethnic communication in Central Asia, but it is unlikely that this will
happen - other Turkic groups are apprehensive of giving such power to Uzbekistan, and
other republics want to promote their own Turkic language. It is a realistic assumption
that Russian will maintain its place in former Soviet Asia. While this provides some
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comfort to Uzbek Russians, many of whom feared marginalization,it also provides them
with an additional reason not to achieve fluency in Uzbek(Kolstoe, 1995:223).
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CONCLUSION
The Russian language was the glue that held the Soviet Union together.
Language policies were carefully constructed to balance the imposition ofRussian and
the promotion of titular languages. The use of the Russian as the defacto state language
for nearly 70 years was an attempt to instill a collective ethno-national identity for all
Soviet peoples. The language brought nations closer to the ideal ofthe Russian
nationality, a “modem” culture which all nationalities should strive to emulate. As
administrations came and went, the role of Russian continued to grow until Gorbachev
came to power in 1985 and with him,the policies ofglasnost'and perestroika. Language
policy was so entwined in all aspects ofthe Soviet system that in 1989, when Gorbachev
allowed Uzbekistan and other nations to elevate the status oftheir titular language over
Russian, the linguistic glue that kept the various republics together disintegrated and the
Soviet Union fell 'with it.

The heightened status ofthe titular language in post-independent Uzbekistan is a
product of Soviet language and nationalities policies. In Soviet times,language was the
defining criterion of ethno-national identity, and the borders of Soviet Central Asia were
drawn largely on the basis oflanguage. Prior to the Bolshevik revolution, Uzbeks and
other Central Asians did not distinguish themselves based on linguistic criteria; what
linguistic criteria they did use to differentiate between languages and dialects conflicted
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with Soviet beliefs of what constituted these. Soviet leaders chose not only what
constituted Uzbek and culture, but also in what manner and to what extent it could be
celebrated. Likewise, it was Soviet leaders who chose in what spheres non-Russian
languages could be used.

As Uzbekistan has attempted to distance itselffrom its Soviet past, the role of
Russian has diminished in favor of Uzbek. Yet the implementation ofUzbek as the state
language is, in essence, no different from the motives of Soviet language policy. Russian
was used as the “language of inter-ethnic communication” within the multilingual Soviet
state; in Uzbekistan, Uzbek is the similarly the “language ofinter-ethnic
communication. The people of Uzbekistan are not entirely ethnic Uzbeks or Russians;
in the 1996 census, Tajiks comprised 5 percent ofthe total population, while Kazakhs,
Karakalpaks and Tatars constituted 3 percent, 2.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively
(CIA World Factbook).

The Uzbek language is once more the defining criterion ofethno-national identity.
There is a clear belief that in Uzbekistan, Uzbek should be spoken. But what does it
mean to be Uzbek? What is the Uzbek language? To be “Uzbek” is to be what Soviet
leaders designated as Uzbek. Similarly, the Uzbek language is what Soviet leaders
designated it to be - it is not the language it was in tsarist Turkestan, which evolved
naturally over the course ofthe past century, but a language selected from a handful of
Turkic dialects and developed according to Russian standards.

Though the status of Russian will likely continue to decline,the effects of Soviet
language policy will remain, both in the attitudes and prejudices towards Russophones

75

and in the use of language as a defining characteristic and a common bond ofthe people
of Uzbekistan. As Uzbeks attempt to distance themselves from the Russian language,
perhaps the greatest representation of the cultural power the Soviet Union held over them,
they will ironically preserve the ethno-national identity of“Uzbek” constructed by Soviet
leaders and use language policy to promote their language as a symbol ofthe state.
Uzbek, not Russian, is now the glue that will hold a multiethnic state together.
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